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After the 51-48 defeat of the CTBT in the Senate, the
National Academy of Sciences was commissioned by
General John Schalikashvili (Former Chair, Joint Chiefs of
Staff) to examine technical issues relating to the CTBT. The
issues reviewed in this paper are as follows:
Verification: Seismic monitoring of tamped, underground
nuclear explosions with the International Monitoring System is
better than what was originally stated (1 kton), to about 0.1 kton.
When the NAS panel took all the factors into account by the NAS,
muffled explosions detonated in cavities can be detected down to
1~2 kton. The advent of interferometric synthetic aperture radar
compliments the CTBT monitoring technologies (seismic,
infrasound, hydroacoustic, radionuclide) and NTM methods
by measuring surface subsidence to 0.1 cm.
Stockpile Stewardship: All scientific review groups agree
that nuclear testing is not needed at this time, and the NAS
concludes that it is unlikely to be needed in the future.
Plutonium decay in the primary stage does not greatly
limit the Pu pit lifetime, which NNSA determined to be a
m i n i m u m o f 4 5 ~ 6 0 y e a r s . T h e m o s t l i ke l y w e a p o n
components to suffer degradation are the non-nuclear components, which can be monitored without the need of nuclear
testing.
Benefits of Cheating: After an evaluation of the weapons
programs of other nations, the NAS concluded that “Very
little of the benefit of a scrupulously observed CTBT
regime would be lost in the case of clandestine testing
within the considerable constraints imposed by the available
monitoring capabilities… The worst-case scenario under a
no-CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to U.S. security sophisticated nuclear weapons in the hands of many, more
adversaries - than the worse-case scenario of clandestine
testing in a CTBT regime, without the constraints posed by
the monitoring system.”

1. CTBT in Context

Building on the experience of three previous nuclear
testing treaties (1), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) bans all nuclear tests of any yield in all places for
all time. This requires the fulfillment of complete bans in
terms of four parameters (number, yield, location and time).
The CTBT is an arms control measure that constrains the
five nuclear weapons states from developing new weapons. In the past, the US tested the most at 1,030 times,
followed by the Former Soviet Union with 715 tests, which
is much more than the tests of other states; France (210),
UK (45) and China (45), as well as India and Pakistan
at about five each. The CTBT is also a nonproliferation
measure since the test ban raises a barrier to the development of first-time nuclear weapons. The 1998 tests by
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non-NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) parties,
India and Pakistan, highlighted the need for a universally
accepted CTBT and NPT. The CTBT also affects the
long-term stability of the NPT. The agreement by the five
nuclear weapon states (China, France, RF, UK, US) to
join the CTBT was the quid pro quo accepted by the five
nuclear weapon states in 1996 to gain the acceptance by 183
non-nuclear weapon states to extend the NPT for all time. The
Council of the American Physical Society approved
statements strongly supporting the CTBT on April 19, 1997
and April 4, 2003 (2).
The CTBT has been signed by 169 nations (December 2003), which amounts to all the nuclear capable
nations, except for India, Iraq, and Pakistan (North Korea has
announced that it possesses nuclear weapons and it has
been widely reported that Israel also has a stock). Of the
signatory nations, 107 have ratified the CTBT, including three
nuclear weapons states (Russia, France, United Kingdom). In
October 1999, the US Senate rejected the CTBT by a vote of 51
to 48. (China stated it will ratify the CTBT only after the US
ratifies it.) After the defeat of the CTBT, the National Academy of
Sciences was asked by the Clinton administration to convene a
panel of experts (3) to examine technical issues that could affect
the viability of a test ban. The results of the NAS study, Technical
Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
were published in 2002 (4). The Academy decided early on not to
evaluate the net benefit of the CTBT to the United States,
but rather the NAS examined the following three technical
issues:
• ability to monitor a test ban, including evasion scenarios.
• US capacity to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile
without testing.
• ability of nations to increase nuclear prowess by cheating
and its effect on US security.
NPT-CTBT Connection. As stated above, the non-nuclear
weapons states view the CTBT as the quid pro quo that fulfills the
requirement of the five nuclear weapons states to balance their
CTBT obligations to the 183 non-nuclear weapon states. This
balancing act was very apparent to the 5 nuclear weapon states in
1996. The NPT would not have been renewed by the 183 states for
all time, without a time limit, unless all five nuclear weapon states
declared they would join the CTBT. The continuation of
the NPT is of fundamental importance to all nations, as it
is the legal capstone that constrains the nuclear rogue states
(President Clinton) and the axis of evil (President George W.
Bush). On December 8, 2003 the General Assembly of the
United Nations passed a resolution that urged all nations to
maintain the nuclear testing moratorium, urged all nations
to sign the CTBT and urged all nations that had signed the
CTBT to ratify it. The gap between the US and the rest of the

PHYSICS AND SOCIETY, Vol. 33, No.3

world could not be more apparent from the following. The vote
in the General Assembly was 173 in favor, 1 against (U.S.)
and four abstentions (Columbia, India, Mauritius, Syria),
while Iraq and North Korea were absent. The intensity of the
global diplomatic opinion on the CTBT/NPT connection is not
understood by the US populace.

2. Monitoring the CTBT

The Senate debate on the CTBT was marred by claims that
cheating could take place without detection at yields up to 70
kilotons. The NAS report strongly contradicts this claim.
T h e CTBT Organi za t i o n ’s I n t e r n a t i o n a l M onitoring
System (IMS) deploys 300 monitoring stations that
use seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, or infrasound
sensors. These facilities are operating today without the CTBT
having entered into force. The IMS network consists of 50
primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations. In addition the
IMS deploys 60 infrasound stations (less than 0.5-kton global
atmospheric threshold detection), 11 hydroacoustic
stations (less than 100-kg global oceanic detection)
and 80 radionuclide stations (less than 1-kton, global
atmospheric detection). In addition, the US uses satellite
optical bhangmeters, particle detectors and EMP detectors to
monitor atmospheric tests. Lastly, US National Technical
Means (NTM) monitors with other technologies, including
satellite reconnaissance, human intelligence (humint) and
other “ints.” The IMS and NTM technologies combine to make
intelligence gathering a synergistic operation that is greater
than the sum of its parts. The fear of being spotted by the
IMS and NTM deters most nations from cheating, and these
measures will be buttressed by on-site inspections. Since the
signing of the CTBT, a potent new technology, interferometric
synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), has been disclosed, which we
will discuss at the end of this section.
The US, Russia and UK have only tested in underground
locations since 1963, and they have been joined in this by
France (1974), China (1980), India (1974, 1998) and Pakistan
(1998). Seismographs are the primary tool for monitoring
underground tests, with the other technologies supplementing
this data. Seismic traces from nuclear explosions differ from
earthquake traces in several ways. Nuclear explosion seismic
data have higher-frequency components than those from earthquakes because the duration of an explosion is much shorter
than the duration of an earthquake. In addition, the ratio of the
short-period, pressure body wave magnitude (mb) to the longperiod, surface wave magnitude (MS), is larger for weapons
than for earthquakes. The zero-threshold limit for the CTBT
was chosen because a finite limit legalizes testing below that
limit and because accurately determining a threshold adds a
source of error (5).
The International Monitoring System (IMS) has the
capability to detect explosions with high confidence (90%
certainty) to an mb level of 3 (less than 2.5 for Russia’s Novaya
Zemlya), which corresponds to a tamped explosion of about
0.1 kton in hard rock throughout Eurasia and North Africa. The
contours in Fig. 1 are in tons (not kilotons). These results are
from the Defense Department’s Center for Monitoring Research,
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which agrees with calculations from the national laboratories
and universities. The limit of 0.1 kton for tamped explosions is
a factor of ten better than the 1 kton limit that was originally
projected for the IMS. Even this estimate can be too cautious
in that it does not take into account the possibility of closein, regional stations. A concerned state could place regional
seismographs close to a suspected region to improve
monitoring. Finally, chemical explosions are usually identifiable as they are not spherical explosions, but they are
often ripple-fired along a line to reduce costs. The required
notification threshold for chemical explosions is 0.3 kton,
which reduces suspicions about chemical explosions.

Fig. 1. IMS seismic monitoring limit (tons). Projected
90%-probable, 3-station detection thresholds in tons of
explosive yield for the IMS network of 50 primary stations. The
IMS detection threshold is below 0.1 kton for all of Eurasia
and below 0.5 kton for all continents worldwide. The 1999
IMS system with 33 stations detected 0.1 kton underground
chemical explosions and a 0.025-kton explosion at the
former Soviet Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan. [Center for
Monitoring Research, Nuclear Testing Programs, Department
of Defense, in Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy of Sciences, National
Academy Press, 2002]
Explosion in a Cavity. There are very little data on nuclear
tests exploded in cavities. If a nuclear weapon is placed in a
cavity of sufficient size, the blast pressure on the cavity wall
falls below the material’s elastic limit, which avoids cracking
and nonlinear effects, reducing the effective seismic yield by
a theoretical factor of 7 at 20 Hz and 70 at lower frequencies.
The only fully decoupled test took place in 1966 when the
0.38-kton Sterling explosion was exploded in a Mississippi salt
cavity with a 17-m radius (from the 5.3-kton, Salmon
explosion); it minimized the observed yield by, at most, a factor of
70. The Soviets carried out a 9-kton test in a cavity at Azgir
in 1976, but it was only partially decoupled, as the weapon
was too large for the cavity’s 36-m radius (from a 64-kton
previous test).
If blast pressure exceeds the elastic limit of the cavity’s
wall material, sufficient energy is absorbed to crack the wall,
increasing coupling to the wall, giving an increased seismic
signal. Critical cavity size depends on explosion depth, but it
is usually assumed to be about 1 km. One expects that R c is
proportional to Y1/3 since the energy to fill the volume of the
cavity to a critical pressure is proportional to the yield, or Y α
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P∆V α R c3. The critical radius for decoupling increases with
yield to the third power, according to
Rc = (15–20 meters)Y1/3,
with Y in kton. From this, a 70-kton explosion needs a cavity
radius of 70 m (a 20-story building) to achieve full decoupling
– an extraordinary engineering challenge when one considers
the secrecy requirements.
We derive the coupling constant from first principles for a
1-kton blast in salt. Because explosion occurs very rapidly,
little heat is transferred during the compression. This dictates
an adiabatic expansion with PVγ= C, a constant. The yield Y
to compress air to the elastic limit of salt is
Y = – P dV = – CV –γ dV = CV 1–γ/(γ – 1) = Po(4πR c3/3)/
(γ – 1) = PoV c/(γ – 1),
where P o is the elastic limit of the wall material and V c is
minimum cavity volume.. Using Y = 1 kton, γ = = 1.2 (very
hot air) and Po = 440 bar for salt’s elastic limit, we obtain the
minimum cavity radius R c = 16 m. The critical radius is 30 m
at a depth of 600 m (6).
Monitoring Limit with Cheating. The NAS panel
concluded that “The only evasion scenarios that need to be
taken seriously at this time are cavity decoupling and mine
masking.” The NAS panel considered many issues that affect
the probability of successfully hiding a nuclear test in a cavity.
For example, covert testing is complicated by the possibility
of venting of radioactive gases from the explosion, which can
easily be detected. The Soviets had 30% of its tests vent, and
the US had severe venting problems during its first decade
of underground testing. Venting from smaller tests is often
harder to contain than venting from larger ones, as the last
four US tests that vented had yields of less than 20 kilotons.
This tendency to vent at lower yields can be explained by the
hypothesis that smaller explosions may not sufficiently enclose
cavities with glassified rubble, and they may not rebound
sufficiently to seal fractures with a stress cage. The NAS panel
considered six other issues as follows:
• Violators need to make accurate yield estimates to avoid
yield excursions.
• Vi o l a t o r s n e e d t o h i d e r e m ove d m a t e r i a l s f r o m
satellites.
• Crater and surface changes from testing are observable.
• Regional seismic signals at 10 Hz improve detection.
• A series of tests is needed to develop significant
weapons.
• Human and other intelligence can give information.
Because the total success probability for hiding a covert test
is the product of the individual-task success (P success = Π i P I),
the NAS panel did not use a decoupling factor of 70 times the
0.1-kton limit to obtain a maximum cheating limit of 7 kton.
Rather, it concluded the following: “Taking all these factors
into account and assuming a fully functional IMS, we judge
that an underground nuclear explosion cannot be confidently
hidden if the yield is larger than 1 or 2 kton.”
Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar. Signatures from
underground nuclear tests can be obtained using accurate
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satellite radar interferometry (7). By combining synthetic
aperture radar data (European Space Agency) from before
and after a nuclear test, crater subsidences as small as 0.1 cm
can be measured. The radar data has a horizontal resolution
of better than 10 m, which is much smaller than a typical
crater subsidence radius of about 100 m. A typical radar frame
covers 100 km by 100 km, sufficient to search wide areas.
The ISAR data can also determine the slow subsidence
relaxation over longer times. This allows ISAR to locate past
explosion locations for which there was no radar data prior to the
explosion. Interferometric radar has some limitations, but it
is a very positive addition to CTBT monitoring.

3. Stockpile Stewardship

The NAS panel examined many factors in its analysis on
the US ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapon
stockpile without testing:
• Confidence requires a high-quality workforce and
adequate budgets.
• Stockpile stewardship and enhanced surveillance must
examine components of weapons.
• Remanufacture to original specifications is the preferred
remedy for age-related defects.
• A highly disciplined process is needed to install changes in
nuclear designs.
• Primary yield that falls below the minimum level needed
to drive a secondary is the most likely potential source of
nuclear-related degradation.
• Based on past experience, the majority of aging problems
will be found in the non-nuclear components, which can be
fully tested under a CTBT. (NNS has stated that nuclear
Pu pits have a minimum lifetime of 45-60 years with
“no life-limiting factors.”)
• In the past, confidence tests were limited to one per year, as
most tests were carried out to critique new designs.
• New stewardship programs, using the Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydro Test (DAHT) facility and Advanced Simulation
and Computing (ASC), are already valuable
During the technical briefings, potential problems for existing warheads (8) in the enduring stockpile were raised. The
NNSA was asked if testing was needed to resolve these issues
and the answer was always “no”. From all of these results, the
Academy panel concluded the following:
“Although a properly focused stockpile stewardship
program is capable, in our judgement, of maintaining
the required confidence in the enduring stockpile under
a CTBT, we do not believe that it will lead to a capability to certify new nuclear subsystem design for entry in the
stockpile without nuclear testing – unless by accepting a
substantial reduction in the confidence in weapon performance
associated with the certification up until now, or a return
to earlier, simpler, single stage design concepts such as
gun-type weapons.”
“It seems to us that the argument to the contrary
– t h a t i s , t h e a rg u m e n t t h a t i m p r ove m e n t s i n t h e
capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence of
nuclear testing will inevitably lose the race with the grow-
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ing needs from an aging stockpile – underestimates the
current capability for stockpile stewardship, underestimates
the effects of current and likely future rates of progress in
improving these capabilities, and overestimates the role
that nuclear testing ever played (or would be ever likely to
play) in ensuring stockpile reliability.”

4. NAS Conclusion on Potential Impact of
Foreign Testing

Section 2 of this paper showed that explosions of tamped
weapons can be detected with high confidence in Eurasia
for yields over 0.1 kton, and explosions in a cavity can be
detected above 1–2 kton. What can nations learn from
cheating at these levels? Nations with lesser prior-testing
experience can carry out equation of state studies, highexplosive lens experiments, certification of bulky inefficient
unboosted fission weapons (gun-type), one-point safety tests,
limited improvement of unboosted fission weapons, proof
tests of compact weapons with yields up to 1–2 kton (with
difficulty and without an excursive yield). Nations with greater
prior-testing nuclear test experience could partially develop
primaries for thermonuclear weapons. The CTBT prevents
the development of low-yield boosted fission weapons,
and the full testing of primaries (over 1–2 kton) and thermonuclear weapons. The NAS study commented on what
Russia, China and other nations could gain from cheating on
a country-by-country basis.
Of course cheating on the CTBT would be a blow
to the political aspects of the nonproliferation regime.
However, the NAS panel concluded the following: “But
potential undetected Russian and Chinese evasive testing is not
relevant to the maintenance of US nuclear weaponry. As
noted in Chapter 1 (on stockpile stewardship), we judge that
the United States has the technical capability to maintain the
reliability of its existing stockpile without testing, irrespective
of whether Russia or China decides they need to test in order
to maintain the reliability of theirs….”
“Very little of the benefit of a scrupulously observed
CTBT regime would be lost in the case of clandestine testing
within the considerable constraints imposed by the available
monitoring capabilities. Those countries that are best able to
successfully conduct such clandestine testing already possess
advanced nuclear weapons of a number of types and could add
little, with additional testing, to the threats they already pose
or can pose to the United States. Countries of lesser nuclear
test experience and design sophistication would be unable
to conceal tests in the numbers and yield required to master
nuclear weapons more advanced than the ones they could
develop and deploy without any testing at all.”
“The worst-case scenario under a no-CTBT regime poses far
bigger threats to U.S. security – sophisticated nuclear weapons
in the hands of many more adversaries – than the worse-case
scenario of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, without the
constraints posed by the monitoring system.”
* D. Hafemeister was the technical staff lead for nuclear
testing for the State Department (1987), the Senate Foreign
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Relations Committee (1990ñ92) and the National Academy of
Sciences CTBT Study (2000ñ02). dhafemei@calpoly.edu.
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